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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gerald Voss contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress, which contended there was no reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop
for speeding, as Mr. Voss was permissibly accelerating toward a section of road with a
higher speed limit. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the district court’s order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Voss, with his wife riding on the back, pulled his motorcycle out of the parking
lot of Cruiser’s Bar and began heading east on Seltice Way and out of the town of
Stateline. (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-6.) He revved his engine as he did so, which he explained
was a “farewell” to some friends still at the bar. (Tr., p.64, Ls.8-9.) Officer Lind was
driving westbound on Seltice “a few hundred yards” down the road. (See Tr., p.52,
Ls.9-14; see also Tr., p.42, Ls.17-21 (the officer marking his location on Defendant’s
Exhibit 1); Aug. p.1.1) The officer heard Mr. Voss’s motorcycle engine “roar,” looked
over to see it accelerating, and estimated Mr. Voss to already be travelling at 50 miles
per hour. (Tr., p.45, Ls.8-11.) He activated his radar, which he said reported Mr. Voss
was travelling at 45 miles per hour. (Tr., p.49, Ls.16-18.)
The applicable speed limit for that section of Seltice is somewhat peculiar, as it
appears the speed limit in one direction (westbound) is 45 miles per hour, and the
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A motion to augment the appellate record with a copy of Defendant’s Exhibit 1,
an aerial depiction of the area around Cruiser’s Bar, upon which both Mr. Voss and
Officer Lind marked various landmarks and positions (Aug. p.1), has been filed
contemporaneously with this brief.
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speed limit in the opposite direction (eastbound) is 35 miles per hour.2 (See generally
Tr.; Exhibits, pp.2-6; Aug. p.1.) Officer Lind initiated a traffic stop based on his radar
reading that Mr. Voss was driving eastbound on Seltice in excess of 35 miles per hour
before reaching the 45-mile-per-hour sign displayed for eastbound drivers. (Tr., p.50,
Ls.8-11.) The district court noted that, in the video of the traffic stop, that 45-mile-perhour sign could be seen as Officer Lind turned around to initiate the traffic stop.
(Tr., p.71, Ls.10-24.)

The officer ultimately arrested Mr. Voss for driving under the

influence. (See, e.g., R., pp.7-14.)
Mr. Voss moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing that there was
no reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because it was permissible for drivers
to accelerate as they approach a speed limit sign which increases the limit going
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The markings on Defendant’s Exhibit 1 depict the conflicting speed zones in this area.
(See Aug. p.1; see generally Tr. (both Mr. Voss and Officer Lind described, at various
points in their testimony, the markings they made on Defendant’s Exhibit 1).) In brief
summary, Crusier’s is at the east end of the town of Stateline, and the limit for
eastbound traffic, such as Mr. Voss, through the town is set at 35 miles per hour.
(Tr., p.38, Ls.17-21.) A 45-mile-per-hour sign is displayed for eastbound traffic east of
the intersection between Seltice and Ante Road, which is beyond the east end of the
Cruiser’s parking lot. (Tr., p. 16, Ls.6-11, p.39, Ls.3-15; see also Exhibits, p.4 (depicting
the eastbound 45-mile-per-hour sign).) Opposite that eastbound 45-mile-per-hour sign
is a sign warning westbound traffic of “Reduced Speed Ahead.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.11-14;
see Exhibits, p.2 (depicting the westbound “Reduced Speed Ahead” sign in relation to
the intersection between Seltice and Ante, as well as the parking lot for Cruiser’s Bar).)
A 35-mile-per-hour sign for westbound traffic is not displayed until the west end of the
Cruiser’s parking lot. (Exhibits, p.6 (specifically showing the westbound 35-mile-perhour sign in relation to the Cruiser’s Bar parking lot); see also Exhibits, p.2 (showing
westbound Reduced Speed Ahead sign in relation to the westbound 35-mile-per-hour
sign, though the westbound 35-mile-per-hour sign is partially obscured); but see
Tr., p.40, Ls.6-9 (Officer Lind testifying that he believed the westbound 35-mile-per-hour
sign was actually displayed where the westbound “Reduced Speed Ahead” sign is
displayed).)
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forward.3 (R., pp.33-46.) Based on the testimony given at the hearing, he also argued
that it would have been impossible for him to have accelerated to 45 miles per hour at
the point which Officer Lind first saw him. (Tr., p.68, Ls.5-17; see Tr., p.59, L.18 - p.61,
L.11 (Mr. Voss testifying about his motorcycle’s acceleration capabilities); see also Tr.,
p.44, Ls.20-25 (Officer Lind indicating that he marked where he first saw the motorcycle
on Defendant’s Exhibit 1); Aug., p.1.) The district court denied the motion to suppress,
concluding that, as a matter of law, the speed limit did not change until the point where
the sign is posted, and thus, accelerating prior to the sign constitutes speeding.
(Tr., p.72, Ls.19-25.) The district court also found Officer Lind credible in his testimony
about the radar showing Mr. Voss’s speed in exceeding 35 miles per hour before the
35-mile-per-hour speed zone ended. (Tr., p.71, L.10 - p.72, L.9.)
Mr. Voss subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to
appeal the order denying his motion to suppress. (Tr., p.74, Ls.13-25.) In the interim,
Mr. Voss began participating in a substance abuse program provided by the
Department for Veterans’ Affairs. (See Tr., p.84, Ls.22-25.) As a result, the State
recommended his sentence be suspended, and defense counsel requested a withheld
judgment.

(Tr., p.85, Ls.1-5, p.86, Ls.16-18.)

The district court imposed a unified

sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, which it suspended for a
two-year period of probation. (Tr., p.87, Ls.19-23.) Mr. Voss filed a notice of appeal
timely from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.78, 90.)
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Mr. Voss initially also argued that his consent to a subsequent breath test was not
valid (R., pp.43-46), but trial counsel subsequently withdrew that argument in light of a
ruling issued by the Idaho Supreme Court after the motion was filed. (Tr., p.6, L.23 p.7, L.3.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Voss’s motion to suppress.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Voss’s Motion To Suppress
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision
on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
which were supported by substantial evidence, but it freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found.

The District Court Erred In Denying

Mr. Voss’s Motion To. “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court.” State v. Conant, 143 Idaho 797, 799 (2007).
Mr. Voss maintains that there is no reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop
based on speeding when the driver is accelerating toward a speed sign which increases
the speed limit going forward. In doing so, he is mindful that the Court of Appeals has
held “the placement of the stop sign [sic] determined the applicable speed limit,” State v.
McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1999), and that the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices, which Idaho has adopted,4 provides that “Speed Limit (R2-1) signs,
indicating speed limits for which posting is required by law, shall be located at the points
of change from one speed limit to another.” U.S. Department of Transportation, Manual
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, p.56 (2009) available at http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/
pdfs/2009/pdf_index.htm.

If there is no reasonable suspicion to justify the initial

detention, the evidence obtained during that detention must be suppressed. See, e.g.,
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 491 (2009).

4

(See R., p.37 (citing “ID ADC 39.03.41.004” for the proposition that Idaho has adopted
the Manual on Uniform of Traffic Control Devices).)
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Voss respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 5th day of August, 2016.

/s/_________________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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